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We explore how labor union a¤ects the wealth-income ratio in an innovation-driven
growth model and nd that it depends on the unions objective. If the union is employment-
oriented (wage-oriented), then a decrease in its bargaining power would have a positive
(an ambiguous) e¤ect on the wealth-income ratio. Calibrating the model to data, we nd
that a decrease in union bargaining power causes a sizable increase in the wealth-income
ratio, which explains at least one-third of the increase in the US wealth-income ratio.
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1 Introduction
The following stylized facts in the US are well documented. First, union membership density
has declined; see Figure 1.1 Second, labor income share has declined; see Figure 2.2 Third, the
wealth-income ratio has increased; see Figure 3.3 This study uses an innovation-driven growth
model with labor union to explore how declining union bargaining power (reecting declining
union membership in the data) a¤ects the wealth-income ratio. We nd that declining union
power decreases labor income share and increases the wealth-income ratio. This nding is
consistent with the above stylized facts and also with the negative relationship in Figure 4
between union membership density and the wealth-income ratio across OECD countries.4
The above results can be explained as follows. A decrease in union bargaining power reduces
labor income and increases prot income,5 which in turn increases the value of rms. This is a
positive e¤ect on the wealth-income ratio. However, union bargaining power also has a general-
equilibrium e¤ect on the wealth-income ratio through employment and economic growth. The
sign of this e¤ect depends on the unions objective. If the union is employment-oriented, then
a decline in its bargaining power would lower employment, which reduces the level of R&D and
the rate of variety expansion (i.e., the rate at which a rm loses its market share). This in turn
increases the value of monopolistic rms and the wealth-income ratio. However, if the union is
wage-oriented, then the opposite e¤ects prevail. In this case, the overall e¤ect of a decline in
union bargaining power on the wealth-income ratio is ambiguous and would be positive if the
households discount rate is below a threshold. Calibrating our model to the data, we nd that
a decrease in union bargaining power leads to a sizable increase in the wealth-income ratio,
which explains at least one-third of the increase in the US wealth-income ratio.
Empirical studies often nd that de-unionization and weaker unions worsen income inequal-
ity.6 Piketty (2014) shows that wealth inequality is an important cause of income inequality
and the wealth-income ratio has increased signicantly in the US. Thus, this study uses a
growth-theoretic framework to explore how union bargaining power a¤ects the wealth-income
ratio. Also, we calibrate the model to data to see how large an e¤ect it can have quantitatively.
This study also relates to the literature on innovation and growth. The seminal study by
Romer (1990) and many subsequent studies assume a neoclassical labor market. Some studies
however explore the e¤ects of labor union on innovation. Palokangas (1996) is an early study
and nds that increasing union bargaining power stimulates growth. In contrast, Boone (2000)
nds that union hurts growth, whereas Ji et al. (2016) nd that union has both negative and
positive growth e¤ects that cancel each other leaving an overall neutral e¤ect. As in Chu et al.
(2016), we nd that union bargaining power can have a positive, neutral or negative e¤ect on
employment and growth depending on the unions objective. This result is similar to Chang
et al. (2007), who consider an AK growth model. Our study di¤ers from Chang et al. (2007)
by considering an R&D-based growth model. More importantly, the current study di¤ers from
all the above studies by exploring how union a¤ects the wealth-income ratio, in addition to
1Data source: OECD Statistics.
2Data source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
3Data source: World Wealth and Income Database.
4We include high-income OECD countries with available data and show the average between 1960 and 2014.
5De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) indeed nd that the prot rate in the US has increased since 1980.
6See for example Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) and Herzer (2016) for recent studies and Manzo and Bruno
(2014) for a survey of earlier studies in the literature.
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employment and growth which have general-equilibrium e¤ects on the wealth-income ratio.
2 The model
We modify the R&D-based growth model from Romer (1990) by considering an economy-wide
labor union that bargains with an economy-wide federation representing employers to determine
wage and employment, which a¤ects innovation. The modelling of the union is based on Chang
et al. (2007). Our model is a closed-economy version of the open-economy model in Chu et al.
(2016).
2.1 Household
The representative household has the following utility function:
U =
1Z
0
e t ln ctdt. (1)
ct denotes consumption of nal good at time t.  > 0 is the discount rate. The household
maximizes utility subject to
_at = rtat + wtlt + bt (L  lt)   t   ct. (2)
at denotes nancial assets (i.e., the equity shares of rms). rt is the real interest rate. wt
is the wage rate. L is the inelastic supply of labor. lt is employment. Therefore, L   lt is
unemployment, and the unemployment rate is ut  1  lt=L. bt is unemployment benet.  t is
a lump-sum tax. Standard dynamic optimization yields the following Euler equation:
_ct
ct
= rt   . (3)
2.2 Final good
A unit continuum of rms produce nal good yt. The production function is
yt = (lt)

Z Nt
0
[xt(i)]
di, (4)
where ;  2 (0; 1) and  +  < 1. lt is the employment of labor. xt(i) is di¤erentiated input
i 2 [0; Nt]. Following Chang et al. (2007), we assume decreasing returns to scale to allow
rms to earn positive prot,7 which is necessary to facilitate bargaining between the employers
federation and the labor union. The prot function of the representative rm is
t = yt   wtlt  
Z Nt
0
pt(i)xt(i)di, (5)
7This can be justied by the presence of a xed factor input owned by the rms.
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where pt(i) is the price of xt(i). The rm chooses xt(i) to maximize t. The conditional demand
function for xt(i) is
pt(i) = (lt)
[xt(i)]
 1. (6)
Here we depart from the usual treatment and follow previous studies to assume that an
economy-wide union bargains with an economy-wide federation representing employers to de-
termine wage wt and employment lt. For simplicity, we consider a closed-shop union under which
only union members are eligible for employment. Following Pemberton (1988) and Chang et
al. (2007), we consider a managerial union whose objective is jointly determined by the union
leadersdesire for a larger membership and the membersdesire for a higher wage. Formally,
we specify a Stone-Geary objective function:8
Ot = (wt   bt)!lt, (7)
where ! > 0 measures the weight that the union places on workerswage income net of unem-
ployment benet. ! > 1 (! < 1) implies that the union is wage-oriented (employment-oriented).
The employersfederation and the labor union bargain over wt and lt. The generalized Nash
bargaining function is
max
wt;lt
Bt = (Ot)
(t)
1 . (8)
The parameter  2 (0; 1) measures the bargaining power of the union relative to the employers.
The bargaining solutions are
@Bt
@wt
= 0, (wt   bt)lt
t
=
!
1   , (9)
@Bt
@lt
= 0, wtlt   yt
t
=

1   . (10)
2.3 Di¤erentiated intermediate inputs
A continuum of industries produce intermediate inputs i 2 [0; Nt]. A monopolist owns a patent
on the technology of di¤erentiated input i. For simplicity, we follow Acemoglu (2002) to assume
an one-to-one technology that uses nal good to produce intermediate input. The prot function
of monopolist i is
t(i) = pt(i)xt(i)  xt(i) = (lt)[xt(i)]   xt(i). (11)
Di¤erentiating (11) with respect to xt(i) yields the familiar prot-maximizing price given by
pt(i) = 1=. To allow for a more realistic quantitative analysis, we introduce an additional
markup parameter  2 (1; 1=), which may capture patent breadth as in Goh and Olivier
(2002) or price regulation as in Evans et al. (2003). In this case, pt(i) = . The demand and
prot functions are
xt(i) =

(lt)


1=(1 )
 xt, (12)
t(i) = (   1)xt(i) = (   1)

(lt)


1=(1 )
 t. (13)
8Alternatively, one can consider Ot = (wt   bt)!(lt). We normalize  = 1 for simplicity.
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2.4 R&D
Following Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), we specify a lab-equipment R&D process. Inventing
a new variety of di¤erentiated inputs requires  units of nal good. The innovation function is
_Nt = Rt=, (14)
where Rt is nal good devoted to R&D. Lets denote vt as an invention value. Free entry in
R&D implies
(vt   ) _Nt = 0. (15)
The no-arbitrage condition is
rt =
t + _vt
vt
, (16)
which equates the interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset, given by the monopolistic
prot t plus any potential capital gain _vt.
2.5 Government
The government provides unemployment benet and nances it by a lump-sum tax. The
balanced-budget condition is
 t = bt (L  lt) . (17)
To ensure balanced growth, we assume unemployment benet bt to be proportional to output
yt; i.e., bt = byt, where b > 0 is a policy parameter.
2.6 Decentralized equilibrium
An equilibrium is a time path of allocations fct; yt; xt(i); lt; Rtg, prices frt; wt; pt(i); vtg and
scal policies f t; btg such that the following conditions hold at each instance of time:
 the household chooses fctg to maximize utility taking frt; wt; bt;  tg as given;
 nal-good rms produce fytg to maximize prot taking prices fpt(i)g as given;
 an economy-wide federation representing nal-good rms bargains with an economy-wide
union to determine fwt; ltg;
 monopolistic rms produce intermediate inputs fxt(i)g and set fpt(i)g to maximize prot;
 R&D rms choose fRtg to maximize prot taking frt; vtg as given;
 the market-clearing condition for nal good holds such that yt = Rt +Ntxt + ct;
 the government balances budget given by  t = bt (L  lt).
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2.7 Employment and economic growth
To solve for equilibrium employment, we substitute (4) and (6) into (5) to obtain
t = (1  )(lt)
Z Nt
0
[xt(i)]
di  wtlt = (1  )yt   wtlt. (18)
Substituting (18) into the bargaining solution in (10) yields the labor income share given by
wtlt
yt
=  + (1    )  s, (19)
which is increasing in union bargaining power . Then, substituting (19) into (18) yields
t
yt
= (1  )(1    ), (20)
which is decreasing in . Substituting (19), (20) and bt = byt into the bargaining solution in
(9) yields
lt =
 + (1  !)(1    )
b
 l < L, (21)
where employment l is decreasing in the unions wage orientation ! but the e¤ect of its bar-
gaining power  depends on the union being wage-oriented or employment-oriented.
Lemma 1 Employment is decreasing (increasing) in bargaining power  if ! > 1 (! < 1).
Proof. Use (21).
Assuming positive R&D, we obtain vt = , which in turn implies _vt = 0. Substituting _vt = 0
into (16) yields the equilibrium invention value given by
v =

r
=
   1
r

l

1=(1 )
, r =    1


l

1=(1 )
, (22)
which uses (13) and v = . Finally, from (3), the equilibrium growth rate of consumption is9
g = r    =    1


l

1=(1 )
   > 0, (23)
which is increasing in employment l.
Lemma 2 Economic growth is decreasing (increasing) in bargaining power  if ! > 1 (! < 1).
Proof. Use (21) and (23).
9It can be shown that g is also the equilibrium growth rate of yt and Nt.
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3 Labor union and the wealth-income ratio
In the model, wealth comes from the ownership of two types of assets: at = a1;t + a2;t, where
a1;t = Ntvt = Ntt=rt is the value of intermediate-good rms, and a2;t is the value of nal-good
rms. Its value follows a no-arbitrage condition: rta2;t = t + _a2;t, where a2;t = t= because
t grows at the same rate as yt as (20) shows. The equilibrium wealth-income ratio is
a
y
=
N
ry
+

y
. (24)
From (20), we have

y
=
(1  )(1    )

, (25)
which is decreasing in union bargaining power . From (4) and (13), we derive
N
ry
=
(   1)x1 
rl
=
   1


+ g()
=

l()=(1 )



=(1 )
, (26)
which is decreasing in growth g() and employment l(). The second equality of (26) uses (3)
and (12), whereas the third equality uses (23).
Substituting (25) and (26) into (24) yields
a
y
=

l()=(1 )



=(1 )
+
(1  )(1    )

, (27)
where l() is given by (21). A decline in union bargaining power  increases the value of nal-
good rms =(y). This is a positive e¤ect on the wealth-income ratio, and the magnitude
of this e¤ect is decreasing in the discount rate . However,  also has a general-equilibrium
e¤ect on the value of intermediate-good rms N=(ry) through employment l and growth g,
which a¤ects the rate of variety expansion (i.e., the rate at which a rm loses its market share)
and the value of intermediate-good rms. The sign of this e¤ect depends on the unions wage
orientation !. The following proposition summarizes these e¤ects of  on a=y.
Proposition 1 Given !  1, a decrease in union bargaining power  leads to an increase in
the wealth-income ratio a=y. Given ! > 1, a decrease in union bargaining power  would lead
to an increase in the wealth-income ratio a=y if and only if  is below a threshold.
Proof. In (27), (1   )(1      )= is decreasing in . From (21) and (23), l and g are
increasing in (independent of)  if ! < 1 (! = 1). Therefore, a=y is decreasing in  if !  1.
As for ! > 1, we di¤erentiate (27) with respect to  to obtain
@a=y
@
=
(!   1)(1    )
b(1  )l()(+1 )=(1 )



=(1 )
  1    

, (28)
which is negative if and only if  is su¢ ciently small.
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Figure 1 shows that labor income share s decreases from 0.63 in 1978 to 0.59 in 2007.
Assuming that this decrease in s is driven by a decrease in , we can calibrate other parameter
values and simulate the e¤ect of the decrease in  on the wealth-income ratio:
a
y
=
   1


+ g()
+
1     s()

, (29)
which is obtained by substituting (19) and (26) into (27).
Given the importance of the discount rate as shown in Proposition 1, we consider a range of
values for  2 [0:03; 0:06]. We consider a markup ratio  of 1.25, which takes on an intermediate
value of the range reported in Jones and Williams (2000).10 We assume a labor intensity  of
0.5. We calibrate the value of  using a long-run growth rate g of 0.02. We calibrate the value
of  by matching a wealth-income ratio of 3.74 in the US in 1978. We normalize L to unity
and calibrate the value of b using an unemployment rate of 0.07 in the US in 1978. Then, we
calibrate the value of ! by matching the decrease in the unemployment rate from 0.07 in 1978
to 0.05 in 2007; see Figure 5.11 Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter values and the
simulation results.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values and simulation results
     b ! 1978 2007 a=y1978 a=y2007
0.03 1.25 0.50 0.62 0.30 0.49 1.32 0.62 0.46 3.74 4.80
0.04 1.25 0.50 0.48 0.26 0.49 1.32 0.52 0.39 3.74 4.54
0.05 1.25 0.50 0.37 0.22 0.49 1.32 0.45 0.33 3.74 4.38
0.06 1.25 0.50 0.28 0.18 0.49 1.32 0.39 0.29 3.74 4.27
Figure 6 plots the simulated paths of the wealth-income ratio using the calibrated paths of
union bargaining power  computed from the HP-lter trend of the US labor income share in
Figure 2. Under a relatively high discount rate of 0.06, the wealth-income ratio in the model
increases from 3.74 in 1978 to 4.27 in 2007, which explains one-third of the increase in the US
wealth-income ratio. Under a lower discount rate of 0.03, the wealth-income ratio in the model
increases from 3.74 in 1978 to 4.80 in 2007, which explains as much as two-thirds of the increase
in the US wealth-income ratio.
4 Conclusion
We have explored the e¤ects of union bargaining power in an R&D-based growth model and
found that a decrease in union bargaining power causes a sizable increase in the US wealth-
income ratio. We should emphasize that our quantitative results should be viewed as illustrative
given our stylized model. Nevertheless, we believe that our study serves as a useful step towards
understanding the relationship between de-unionization and the rising wealth-income ratio.
10In the online appendix, we explore other parameter values to ensure the robustness of our results.
11Data source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Figure 1: HP-lter trend of US union membership density
Figure 2: HP-lter trend of US labor income share
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Figure 3: HP-lter trend of US wealth-income ratio
Figure 4: Union membership density and wealth-income ratio
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Figure 5: HP-lter trend of US unemployment rate
Figure 6: Simulated paths of the wealth-income ratio
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Online Appendix
In this appendix, we perform robustness checks on our simulation results. First, we consider
a range of values for the markup ratio  2 f1:05; 1:40g as reported in Jones and Williams
(2000). The other parameters are calibrated to the same moments as before. Tables A1 and
A2 summarize the calibrated parameter values and the simulation results, which are largely
similar to the results in Table 1.
Table A1: Calibration and simulation for  = 1:05
     b ! 1978 2007 a=y1978 a=y2007
0.03 1.05 0.50 0.15 0.27 0.49 1.32 0.55 0.40 3.74 4.82
0.04 1.05 0.50 0.11 0.23 0.49 1.32 0.47 0.35 3.74 4.55
0.05 1.05 0.50 0.08 0.19 0.49 1.32 0.41 0.30 3.74 4.39
0.06 1.05 0.50 0.06 0.16 0.49 1.32 0.36 0.27 3.74 4.28
Table A2: Calibration and simulation for  = 1:40
     b ! 1978 2007 a=y1978 a=y2007
0.03 1.40 0.50 0.86 0.32 0.49 1.32 0.68 0.51 3.74 4.79
0.04 1.40 0.50 0.68 0.28 0.49 1.32 0.57 0.42 3.74 4.53
0.05 1.40 0.50 0.53 0.24 0.49 1.32 0.47 0.35 3.74 4.37
0.06 1.40 0.50 0.41 0.19 0.49 1.32 0.41 0.30 3.74 4.27
Second, we consider calibrating the value of  by targeting a long-run technology growth
rate of g = 0:01, instead of the per capita GDP growth rate. Once again, we consider a range
of values for the markup ratio  2 f1:05; 1:40g. The other parameters are calibrated to the
same moments as before. Tables A3 and A4 summarize the calibrated parameter values and
the simulation results, which are once again largely similar to the results in Table 1.
Table A3: Calibration and simulation for  = 1:05 and g = 0:01
     b ! 1978 2007 a=y1978 a=y2007
0.03 1.05 0.50 0.19 0.27 0.49 1.32 0.55 0.41 3.74 4.82
0.04 1.05 0.50 0.13 0.23 0.49 1.32 0.47 0.35 3.74 4.55
0.05 1.05 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.49 1.32 0.41 0.31 3.74 4.39
0.06 1.05 0.50 0.07 0.16 0.49 1.32 0.37 0.27 3.74 4.28
Table A4: Calibration and simulation for  = 1:40 and g = 0:01
     b ! 1978 2007 a=y1978 a=y2007
0.03 1.40 0.50 1.10 0.33 0.49 1.32 0.76 0.56 3.74 4.78
0.04 1.40 0.50 0.83 0.29 0.49 1.32 0.60 0.45 3.74 4.52
0.05 1.40 0.50 0.63 0.25 0.49 1.32 0.49 0.37 3.74 4.37
0.06 1.40 0.50 0.48 0.20 0.49 1.32 0.42 0.31 3.74 4.27
Finally, we consider other values for labor intensity  2 f0:45; 0:55g. We assume  = 1:25
and g = 0:02 as in the paper. The other parameters are also calibrated to the same moments
as before. Tables A5 and A6 summarize the calibrated parameter values and the simulation
results, which are once again largely similar to the results in Table 1.
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Table A5: Calibration and simulation for  = 0:45
     b ! 1978 2007 a=y1978 a=y2007
0.03 1.25 0.45 0.62 0.30 0.43 1.28 0.70 0.57 3.74 4.80
0.04 1.25 0.45 0.48 0.26 0.43 1.28 0.60 0.49 3.74 4.54
0.05 1.25 0.45 0.37 0.22 0.43 1.28 0.53 0.43 3.74 4.38
0.06 1.25 0.45 0.28 0.18 0.43 1.28 0.47 0.38 3.74 4.27
Table A6: Calibration and simulation for  = 0:55
     b ! 1978 2007 a=y1978 a=y2007
0.03 1.25 0.55 0.61 0.30 0.56 1.37 0.50 0.28 3.74 4.80
0.04 1.25 0.55 0.47 0.26 0.56 1.37 0.40 0.23 3.74 4.54
0.05 1.25 0.55 0.36 0.22 0.56 1.37 0.33 0.19 3.74 4.38
0.06 1.25 0.55 0.28 0.18 0.56 1.37 0.28 0.16 3.74 4.27
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